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Medicare Payment andHospital
Provision of Outpatient Care to the
Uninsured
Daifeng He and Jennifer M. Mellor
Objective. To describe the amount of hospital outpatient care provided to the unin-
sured and its association with Medicare payment rate cuts following the implementa-
tion ofMedicare’s Outpatient Prospective Payment System.
Data Sources/Study Setting. We use hospital outpatient discharge records from
Florida from 1997 through 2008.
Study Design. We estimate multivariate regression models of hospital outpatient care
provided to the uninsured in separate samples of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.
Principal Findings. Hospital outpatient departments provide significant amounts of
care to the uninsured. As Medicare payment rates fall, total charges and the share of
charges for outpatient visits by the uninsured decrease at nonprofit hospitals. At for-
profit hospitals, the share of outpatient care provided to uninsured patients increases,
but there is no significant change in the number of uninsured discharges.
Conclusions. Nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond differently to reductions in
Medicare payments; thus, studies of the impact of legislated Medicare payment cuts on
care of the uninsured should account for differences in hospital ownership in communi-
ties. Given that outpatient care to the uninsured includes preventive and diagnostic care
procedures, reductions in this care following payment cuts may adversely affect long-
run health and health care costs in communities dominated by nonprofit hospitals.
Key Words. Uninsured/safety net providers, Medicare, hospitals, administrative
data uses
In 2011, U.S. hospitals provided $41.1 billion of care for the uninsured or
underinsured in the form of charity care and bad debt, amounting to 5.9 per-
cent of all hospital expenses (AHA, 2013). Although much of this care takes
place in emergency departments (EDs), the uninsured make millions of non-
ED outpatient hospital visits every year (CDC/NCHS, 2013a). In 2010, unin-
sured patients accounted for nearly 7 million visits to U.S. hospital outpatient
departments not including EDs, or 6.9 percent of all such visits; by compar-
ison, inpatient discharges of the uninsured numbered 2.2 million and
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represented a slightly lower 6.2 percent of short-stay discharges (CDC/
NCHS, 2013b,c). Numerous studies have examined the determinants of inpa-
tient or overall hospital care provided to the uninsured, but little is known
about the factors associated with hospital outpatient care provision to the
uninsured. This is an unfortunate gap in the literature as outpatient care
increasingly serves as a substitute for more expensive inpatient care, and its
timely receipt can reduce the subsequent need for additional care. As several
types of payment cuts in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) reduce the support
that hospitals receive for providing care to the uninsured, and as millions of
Americans will remain uninsured even with the coverage expansions in the
ACA, the provision of care to the uninsured remains an important topic (KFF,
2013).
This study provides new findings on the provision of hospital outpatient
care to the uninsured using hospital outpatient discharge records from Florida
from 1997 through 2008. First, we describe patterns in hospital outpatient care
provided to uninsured patients by examining levels and trends and the types
of outpatient care provided in Florida. Next, we build on the prior literature
by estimating the association between hospital outpatient care provided to the
uninsured and payments in the Medicare program. As theory and empirical
evidence suggest that the effects of Medicare payment policies vary by owner-
ship, we examine care provision among all private short-term acute care
hospitals and then separately by hospital ownership.
We focus on the exogenous Medicare payment changes brought on by
the Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS), which was established
by the BBA of 1997 and went into effect in 2000. Prior empirical studies report
that other types of Medicare and Medicaid payment cuts reduced uncompen-
sated care provided by nonprofit and safety-net hospitals (Davidoff et al.
2000; Bazzoli et al. 2006; Hsieh and Bazzoli 2012). These studies examine
either hospitals’ provision of inpatient care to the uninsured or hospital uncom-
pensated care in all settings. Even within the broader literature on hospital
treatment of the uninsured, we know of only two studies on outpatient care,
and neither examines changes in the payment rates of public programs. Frank
and Salkever (1991) model both inpatient and outpatient charity care and bad
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debt admissions among Maryland hospitals; Garmon (2009) examines the
effect of hospital competition on inpatient and outpatient uncompensated care
by Florida and Texas hospitals. Thus, our study is the first to examine the
association between Medicare payment and outpatient hospital care for the
uninsured.
These changes in outpatient care are worth examining as outpatient care
plays an increasingly important role. From 2002 to 2007, Medicare outpatient
spending per beneficiary grew 47 percent while inpatient spending grew only
18 percent (MedPAC, 2009). Further, outpatient care may be more responsive
to financial pressures than inpatient care. Because hospitals are required by
law to stabilize emergency department patients regardless of ability to pay,
they may have little flexibility in selectively admitting certain types of inpa-
tients. In contrast, hospitals in general are not legally required to provide
nonemergency care to patients in the outpatient setting, and theymay bemore
flexible in adjusting outpatient care provision to the uninsured.
Conceptual Framework
Below we review prior theoretical models of hospital behavior to explain how
Medicare payment can affect the provision of care to the uninsured. We draw
on existing economic theories and empirical work regarding hospitals’ deci-
sions to provide uncompensated care. As noted by Davidoff et al. (2000),
much of the literature suggests that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals’
decisions regarding uncompensated care provision should be examined sepa-
rately. Our summary emphasizes several key insights from Banks, Paterson,
and Wendel (1997), which contrasts the different objectives of nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals and examines both types of hospitals’ responses to
payment changes.
In the case of nonprofit hospitals, economic models typically assume
that the hospital’s objective is to maximize utility, where utility increases with
the amount of uncompensated care provided (e.g., Frank and Salkever 1991;
Gruber, 1994). Hospitals choose the amount of uncompensated care subject to
the constraint that hospital profit equals zero; hospital profit is defined as rev-
enue per patient times the number of patients, less costs. Solving their model
mathematically, Banks, Paterson, and Wendel (1997) show that as the price
received by paying patients (revenue per patient) falls, uncompensated care
provision falls as well.
Empirical studies of nonprofit hospitals support this theoretical predic-
tion. Davidoff et al. (2000) find that increases in Medicaid and Medicare
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payment generosity increased the amount of uncompensated care provided
by nonprofit hospitals. Bazzoli et al. (2006) find that core safety-net hospitals
reduced the amount of uncompensated care in response to Medicaid payment
pressures triggered by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997. Hsieh and
Bazzoli (2012) report that reductions in Medicaid Disproportionate Share
Hospital (DSH) payments led nonprofit hospitals to reduce their uncompen-
sated care provision.
In contrast, economic models of for-profit hospitals assume that profit
maximization is the hospital’s objective. The decision to provide uncompen-
sated care is viewed as a “business decision” that may improve a hospital’s
standing in the community or relationship with physicians (Gray 1991). In
Banks, Paterson, and Wendel (1997), the for-profit hospital’s cost function
includes the costs of producing health care as well as the “expected penalty
cost” of underproviding uncompensated care in the community. Mathemati-
cally, Banks, Paterson, and Wendel (1997) show that a decrease in the price
paid by paying patients reduces the hospital’s provision of care to paying
patients, which then lowers the cost of providing uncompensated care and
increases the amount of uncompensated care provided by the hospital. Intu-
itively, a drop in the price received by paying patients makes it less costly for
for-profit hospitals to provide uncompensated care. Consistent with this
theory, Banks, Paterson, and Wendel (1997) find that cuts in Medicare and
Medicaid payment generosity led for-profit California hospitals to increase
their provision of uncompensated care.
In summary, existing theoretical and empirical studies suggest that hos-
pital responses to cuts in public program payment generosity vary by owner-
ship. We therefore estimate models of care to the uninsured in separate
samples of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals; for completeness, we also use
the sample of all private hospitals. We hypothesize that cuts in Medicare pay-
ments will reduce the amount of care provided to the uninsured by nonprofit
hospitals and increase the amount of care provided to the uninsured by for-
profit hospitals.
DATA ANDMETHODS
Discharge Data
We use 1997–2008 outpatient discharge data from private short-term acute
care hospitals in Florida. These data exclude emergency department visits and
include discharges from traditional hospital outpatient departments and from
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hospital-owned freestanding clinics. It is not possible to separate the latter two
groups. Changes in hospital care provided to the uninsured in this state are
especially relevant as Florida is estimated to have nearly 764,000 low-income
persons in the coverage gap created by the state’s decision not to expand
Medicaid. Florida residents comprise 16 percent of the total 4.8 million such
persons nationwide (KFF, 2013).
Measures of Outpatient Care Provided to the Uninsured
We construct several hospital-specific measures of outpatient care to the unin-
sured. We count discharges to uninsured patients when the principal payer is
reported as either “charity care,” a combined category labeled “self-pay/
underinsured/no third-party coverage or less than 30 percent estimated cover-
age,” or “other state and local government;” we then calculate, for each hospi-
tal and year, the number of uninsured outpatient discharges and total charges
for these discharges, and the share of all outpatient discharges and the share of
all outpatient charges accounted for by uninsured patients. In constructing
these measures, we exclude discharges that consist only of lab charges; our
results are very similar when lab-only discharges are included. Charges are
reported in 2008 dollars.
The selection of these payer categories is similar to prior studies on inpa-
tient care provision to the uninsured; for example, Sloan, Morrisey, and Val-
vona (1988) measure the hospital’s share of inpatients for whom the payer was
either self-pay or no charge, Frank and Salkever (1991) measure charity care
as the combined number of self-pay and charity discharges, and Currie and
Fahr (2004) define uninsured discharges as self-pay, charity, no charge, and
county indigent patients. If self-pay patients pay their bills, their inclusion may
overstate the amount of charity care; however, it is reasonable to include this
group as discharge records report only the expected payer at the time of dis-
charge and as Frank and Salkever (1991) note, “hospitals presumably realize
there is a high probability these individuals will not be able to pay their bills”
(p. 436). Furthermore, Florida discharge data do not distinguish self-pay from
underinsured.
We include discharges paid by “other state and local governments” fol-
lowing prior research on indigent hospital care financing in Florida ( Jackson
and Beatty 2003). Florida statute delegates the responsibility of providing care
to uninsured indigent persons to local counties; several counties use local
property or sales taxes to support care for indigent residents who do not
qualify for other programs. For example, Palm Beach County uses property
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tax revenues to pay local physicians and hospitals to provide care to the unin-
sured through a type of managed care program. Polk County funds care to the
indigent provided by private hospitals and physicians through a sales tax. Fur-
thermore, counties differ in how hospitals record the payer for those dis-
charges where the local county program provides payment. For example,
Broward County does not use the payer designation of “other government”
for patients covered by the county indigent care program, while Miami-Dade
County does use this designation ( Jackson and Beatty 2003, p. 111).
Measure of Medicare Payment Change
To examine the association between Medicare payment rate cuts and hospital
outpatient care provision to the uninsured, we focus on the exogenous pay-
ment changes brought by the OPPS, which was established by the BBA of
1997 and went into effect in 2000. OPPS replaced the prior cost-based system
of reimbursing hospital outpatient departments for services provided to Medi-
care patients with a new system of predetermined payment rates that apply to
all procedures in a given group of outpatient services called an Ambulatory
Payment Classification. Prior studies show that OPPS significantly lowered
the overall generosity of Medicare payments for outpatient care and reduced
the average Medicare payments for common outpatient surgical procedures
in Florida (He andMellor 2012).
Importantly, OPPS had differing effects on the size and even the direc-
tion of Medicare payment changes depending on both the hospital and the
procedure. Depending on procedure- and hospital-specific rates prior to 2000,
Medicare payment rates decreased under OPPS for some hospitals and proce-
dures and increased for others. For this study, in which we wish to examine
the overall impact of Medicare payment changes on each hospital, we follow
prior research and examine the 10 most commonly used outpatient surgical
procedures in hospital outpatient settings in 1999, the last year prior to OPPS.
These 10 procedures represent about one-third of all surgical procedures per-
formed in Florida hospital outpatient departments. There are more than 8,000
outpatient procedures and it is impractical to impute hospital-specific
Medicare payment rates for all, especially in the pre-OPPS era.
He and Mellor (2012) developed an algorithm to impute the hospital-
specific changes inMedicare payment rates for these 10 procedures and report
that payment rates decreased for all but one of these procedures between 1999
and 2004, the first year that OPPS was fully implemented; reductions range
from 7 to 84 percent by procedure and average 22 percent (Table 1C, p. 736).
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Using results from this algorithm, we calculate each hospital’s weighted-aver-
age Medicare payment across the top 10 procedures, where the weight is the
number of times a given procedure was performed in the hospital outpatient
department divided by the combined number of times all 10 procedures were
performed in the hospital outpatient department. See the Appendix in He and
Mellor (2012) for details on imputing theMedicare payment rates for common
outpatient procedures before and after the implementation of OPPS. All pay-
ment data are reported in 2008 dollars.
Although the literature on charity care and uncompensated care identi-
fies Medicaid provider payment as another relevant payment variable, our
single-state study is not a good setting in which to examine this measure.Medi-
care andMedicaid DSH payments are another financial pressure examined in
the literature; however, as Currie and Fahr (2004) note, hospitals can vary
caseloads endogenously in response to DSH. They advise controlling for the
effect of the DSH program by including the hospital’s low-income caseload
revenue at a baseline year (see also Duggan 2000). Hospital fixed effects,
which we include in our models, effectively do this.
Other Measures
Our regression models include a number of control variables from various
sources. As some prior studies report that increasing competition in the hospi-
tal market reduces the provision of uncompensated care (e.g., Thorpe and
Phelps 1991), we control for market concentration with a county-level
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated for each year from the hospi-
tal outpatient discharge records, similar to Thorpe and Phelps (1991) and
Davidoff et al. (2000).
Following Currie and Fahr (2004), we also include controls for the pre-
dicted number of Medicaid patients and the predicted number of uninsured
patients to account for other factors that may impact the hospital’s treatment
of the uninsured. Predicted Medicaid enrollment is calculated by using outpa-
tient discharge records to estimate a linear probability model of whether the
patient had Medicaid coverage, where race and ethnicity, sex, age dummies,
and four-digit zip code dummies are the explanatory variables. This model is
estimated separately for each year of discharge records, and then the estimated
coefficients from each year’s model are applied to each hospital’s discharges
from 1997, the baseline year in the sample, to predict the number of patients
that would be eligible for Medicaid in subsequent years. The predicted
number of uninsured patients is constructed in a similar manner. The use of a
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baseline sample of patients makes these predicted patient counts independent
of changes in discharges caused by other factors throughout the study period.
We include additional county-level controls such as the percent of the
population aged 65 and up in each year, the annual unemployment rate, and
annual median household income (in 2008 dollars). These variables capture
the effects of changing demand for care by the uninsured, which may decrease
with Medicare enrollment and increase with worsening economic circum-
stances. Population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; eco-
nomic data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area
Unemployment reports and theMarchCurrent Population Survey. To capture
differences in the supply of care, we control for the number of physicians per
capita in the county-year (obtained from the Area Resource File), and the hos-
pital’s teaching status and bed size (obtained from Florida’s annual Hospital
Beds and Services List).
Finally, to gauge the direct effect of Medicare payment cuts on hospi-
tals’ care provision to the Medicare population, we construct several hospi-
tal- and year-specific measures of outpatient care provided to Medicare
fee-for-service (FFS) patients: the number of Medicare FFS outpatient
discharges, the total charges for these discharges, and the shares of all out-
patient discharges and all outpatient charges accounted for by Medicare FFS
patients. Here, we also exclude discharges that consist only of lab charges
and report charges in 2008 dollars.
Estimation Strategy
We first examine whether our measure of Medicare payments had the
potential to reduce the hospital’s revenue from treating Medicare patients.
The discharge data do not include measures of payments to hospitals from
Medicare, so we focus on two related measures: discharges of Medicare
patients and charges associated with these discharges. We use these data to
estimate equation (1):
Medicare Careht ¼ a0 þ a1 logðMedicare OP paymenthtÞ þ Zct
Y
þXhtC
þ kt þ ah þ eht
ð1Þ
Medicare Care is one of four measures: the log of the number of dis-
charges, the log of total charges, and the share of discharges and the share of
charges accounted for by Medicare FFS patients. We focus on Medicare FFS
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as the changes triggered by OPPS should not affect patients covered by plans
that use other payment arrangements. In our data it is not possible to separate
managed care plans that use discounted fee-for-service from those that use
capitation.
We then test our main hypotheses by estimating equation (2):
Uninsured Careht ¼ a0 þ a1 logðMedicare OP paymenthtÞ þ Zct
Y
þXhtC
þ kt þ ah þ eht
ð2Þ
The dependent variable is one of four measures of outpatient care pro-
vided to the uninsured: the log of uninsured discharges, the log of total unin-
sured charges, plus the share of discharges and the share of charges accounted
for by uninsured patients.
The key explanatory variable in all models is Medicare OP Paymentht, the
weighted-average Medicare reimbursement rate for the 10 most common
outpatient surgical procedures, defined for hospital h in year t. Zct is a set of
county-year-level controls (such as median household income, unemploy-
ment rate, and other variables described earlier) and Xht is a set of hospital-
year-level controls (bed size, teaching status). Controls included in equation (2)
but not equation (1) are the HHI, the predicted number of Medicaid patients,
and the predicted number of uninsured patients. Both equations include year
fixed effects and hospital fixed effects (kt and ah). The year fixed effects capture
important sources of time-series variation in the provision of care to the
uninsured, sources that are common to all hospitals (e.g., Medicaid provider
payment rates). The hospital fixed effects capture time-invariant factors that
determine the provision of care to the uninsured and are specific to the hospi-
tal (e.g., controls for DSH payments, as described earlier). We estimate the
models with data from 1997 to 2008 but excluding 2000–2003 because OPPS
was phased-in gradually during those years. The coefficients of interest are a1.
For each estimate of a1, we report robust standard errors first clustered by
hospital and then by county.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 illustrates patterns in the provision of outpatient care to the
uninsured by all private short-term acute hospitals in Florida. The top
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panel shows that the number of outpatient discharges of uninsured
patients reached a high of 73,065 in 2004 before falling to 61,793 by
2008. Nonprofit hospitals treated more uninsured patients than for-profit
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Figure 1: Uninsured Discharges and Charges at Hospital Outpatient
Departments 1997–2008
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hospitals. In 2008, there were 46,792 outpatient discharges of uninsured
patients at nonprofit hospitals and 15,001 at for-profit hospitals. The bot-
tom panel shows uninsured outpatient charges by year and hospital
ownership. Total uninsured charges increased over time for all private
hospitals and both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. In 2008, uninsured
outpatient charges at private hospitals amounted to $596.7 million. Total
charges were greater and grew faster in nonprofit hospitals relative to
for-profit hospitals.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the measures of care provided to
the uninsured and the explanatory variables. The average nonprofit hospital
had 588 uninsured outpatient discharges per year while the average for-profit
hospital reported 202 uninsured outpatient discharges. Total charges averaged
about $4 million per hospital per year at nonprofit hospitals, about twice the
amount at for-profit hospitals. Shares of discharges and total charges
accounted for by the uninsured averaged 5 and 6 percent, respectively, in non-
profit hospitals, each a percentage point above the average among for-profit
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 1997–2008
All Private Hospitals
(n = 1,091)
Nonprofit Hospitals
(n = 507)
For-Profit Hospitals
(n = 584)
Dependent variables
Uninsured discharges 381.6 (613.3) 588.2 (811.2) 202.2 (250.5)
Uninsured charges
(millions of 2008 $)
2.9 (4.0) 4.0 (5.1) 2.0 (2.2)
Share of discharges for
the uninsured
0.05 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05)
Share of charges for the
uninsured
0.05 (0.06) 0.06 (0.05) 0.05 (0.06)
Explanatory variables
Medicare payment rate 644.0 (276.2) 695.0 (276.4) 599.8 (268.4)
HHI 0.27 (0.21) 0.26 (0.21) 0.27 (0.21)
PredictedMedicaid 580.3 (862.1) 821.2 (1,186.2) 371.1 (272.1)
Predicted uninsured 350.9 (506.1) 493.7 (678.3) 226.9 (215.4)
Percent age 65+ 18.6 (6.6) 18.2 (6.6) 19.1 (6.6)
Unemployment rate 4.6 (1.5) 4.5 (1.4) 4.7 (1.5)
Median household
income (2008 $)
40,740 (6,985) 40,629 (6,866) 40,836 (7,093)
Physicians per capita 2.3 (0.9) 2.4 (0.9) 2.2 (0.8)
Teaching status 0.04 (0.20) 0.09 (0.29) 0.00 (0.00)
Acute beds 256.8 (157.6) 306.8 (193.2) 213.4 (99.9)
Notes. Sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are calculated based on the period
from 1997 to 2008. See text for details.
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hospitals. The Medicare payment rate averaged $695 and $600 for nonprofit
and for-profit hospitals, respectively.
We identify some of the most common CPT codes on the outpa-
tient discharge records of uninsured patients. Appendix Table A1 reports
the CPT codes associated with the 25 most common procedures in
2008; these procedures account for 41 percent of the principal proce-
dures appearing on outpatient discharge records of uninsured patients in
that year. The five most common CPTs account for about 20 percent of
all procedures the uninsured receive in Florida hospital outpatient
departments. These are fetal nonstress tests (CPT 59025), blood draws
(CPT 36415), an endoscopic test to examine the lining of the esophagus
(CPT 43239), and colonoscopy (CPTs 45378 and 45380). Several differ-
ent colonoscopy procedures appear among the 25 most common CPTs;
together these constitute almost 8 percent of all procedures on the hos-
pital outpatient discharge records of uninsured patients in 2008. A num-
ber of the top 25 procedures include biopsies of the esophagus, breast,
colon, and liver; these account for more than 10 percent of procedures.
The data suggest that much of the outpatient care provided to the unin-
sured is preventive or diagnostic care. For example, CPTs 45378,
45380, 45385, 45384 are used in colorectal cancer screening and CPT
36415 is used in screening for diabetes, anemia, sexually transmitted
diseases, and prostate cancer, among others.
Multivariate Regression Results
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients on Medicare payment from equa-
tion (1); the results demonstrate that Medicare payment cuts had the potential
to reduce hospital revenue from treatingMedicare patients. In the full sample,
the coefficient on Medicare payment is positive and significant in three of the
four models; thus, decreases in Medicare payments were associated with
decreases in the total counts and sums of Medicare charges as well as the
shares of charges and discharges accounted for by Medicare FFS patients. We
see comparable patterns in the payment coefficient estimates in subsamples of
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, although the coefficients are less precisely
estimated.
Table 3 reports key coefficient estimates for equation (2), where the
dependent variables represent outpatient care provided to uninsured patients
(Tables A2, A3, and A4 in the online appendix report all coefficient esti-
mates). In models estimated with the full set of private hospitals, the payment
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coefficients are not statistically significant, and the signs of the estimates are
mixed.We next split the sample and allow the payment effects to vary by own-
ership type, as predicted by theory. Among nonprofit hospitals, we find that
decreases in Medicare payments are associated with a statistically significant
reduction in total charges for the uninsured (column 2; p < .05) and a margin-
ally significant decline in the share of charges accounted for by the uninsured
(column 4; p < .10). For example, a 1 percent decrease in the Medicare pay-
ment measure is associated with a 1.03 percent decrease in total uninsured
charges; for the average nonprofit hospital, this represents a decrease of
$20,200 in the annual charges associated with the outpatient care of uninsured
patients.
Among for-profit hospitals, we find that reductions in Medicare
payments are associated with statistically significant increases in the share of
discharges and the share of charges (columns 3 and 4) associated with unin-
sured patients. For example, a 1 percent decrease in Medicare payment is
associated with a 1.2 percentage point increase in the share of uninsured dis-
charges. For the average for-profit hospital, this represents an increase from 4
to 5 percent. This is a sizeable effect; however, note that the share of uninsured
Table 2: Regression Models of Outpatient Care to Medicare Fee-for-Service
Patients: Estimated Coefficients onMedicare Payment
log (Medicare
Discharges)
log (Medicare
Charges)
Share of Discharges for
Medicare Pts
Share of Charges for
Medicare Pts
All private hospitals (154 hospitals, 1,144 observations)
log (Medicare
Payment)
0.33
[0.20]
0.49
[0.25]
3.47
[1.97]
3.68
[1.56]**
[0.17] [0.23]** [1.57]** [1.36]**
Nonprofit hospitals (84 hospitals, 544 observations)
log (Medicare
Payment)
0.12
[0.36]
0.39
[0.43]
3.11
[2.73]
2.02
[2.77]
[0.31] [0.21] [3.39] [3.35]
For-profit hospitals (85 hospitals, 600 observations)
log (Medicare
Payment)
0.33
[0.25]
0.48
[0.30]
3.04
[2.60]
4.04
[1.91]**
[0.23] [0.31] [1.79] [1.54]**
Notes. All models also include controls for the percent of the county population age 65 and up, the
county unemployment rate and its square, median household income in the county and its square,
physicians per capita in the county and its square, the number of acute care beds in the hospital, an
indicator for teaching hospitals, plus hospital fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors clustered by hospital are shown in the first row of brackets, and robust standard errors clus-
tered by county are shown in the second row of brackets.
Statistical significance indicated by ** for .05 level.
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discharges could rise simply because of a decline in the number of discharges
paid by other payers, such as Medicare. For this reason, together with the lack
of a significant association between Medicare payment and the number of
uninsured discharges at for-profits (column 1 of Table 3) and the evidence
in Table 2, we do not interpret the statistically significant increase in the
uninsured share as an increase in the absolute amount of care provided by
for-profit hospitals to the uninsured.
In Table 3, we also report the estimated coefficients on the predicted
uninsured variable given its strong association with hospital provision of care
Table 3: Regression Models of Outpatient Care to the Uninsured: Esti-
mated Coefficients onMedicare Payment
log (Uninsured
Discharges)
log (Uninsured
Charges)
Share of Discharges for
the Uninsured
Share of Charges for
the Uninsured
All private hospitals (146 hospitals, 1,091 observations)
log (Medicare
Payment)
0.08
[0.17]
0.29
[0.26]
0.58
[0.80]
0.90
[1.07]
[0.21] [0.37] [0.42] [0.63]
log (Predicted
Uninsured)
0.63
[0.13]***
0.53
[0.16]***
3.39
[0.71]***
3.59
[0.77]***
[0.12]*** [0.13]*** [0.70]*** [0.65]***
Nonprofit hospitals (77 hospitals, 507 observations)
log (Medicare
Payment)
0.37
[0.23]
1.03
[0.49]**
1.28
[0.85]
2.22
[1.24]
[0.24] [0.45]** [0.80] [1.19]
log (Predicted
Uninsured)
1.19
[0.24]***
1.23
[0.39]***
6.29
[1.35]***
6.60
[1.48]***
[0.21]*** [0.22]*** [1.34]*** [1.26]***
For-profit hospitals (84 hospitals, 584 observations)
log (Medicare
Payment)
0.12
[0.16]
0.13
[0.18]
1.20
[0.91]
1.95
[1.13]
[0.16] [0.21] [0.58]** [0.91]**
log (Predicted
Uninsured)
0.21
[0.14]
0.04
[0.15]
1.67
[0.63]**
1.52
[0.78]
[0.14] [0.17] [0.60]*** [0.68]**
Notes. All models also include controls for the percent of the county population age 65 and up, the
county unemployment rate and its square, median household income in the county and its square,
physicians per capita in the county and its square, a county-based Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of
market concentration (HHI), the predicted number ofMedicaid patients, the number of acute care
beds in the hospital, an indicator for teaching hospitals, plus hospital fixed effects and year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by hospital are shown in the first row of brackets, and
robust standard errors clustered by county are shown in the second row of brackets. See
Appendix Tables A2, A3, and A4 for the estimated coefficients of the other variables in the model.
Statistical significance indicated by *** for .01 level and ** for .05 level.
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to this group. The estimated coefficients are positive and most are statistically
significant. For example, a 1 percent decrease in the predicted number of unin-
sured persons is associated with a 1.2 percent decrease in uninsured discharges
and charges at nonprofit hospitals.
We examined the sensitivity of our main results to several changes in the
model specifications (see Table A4 in the online appendix). In one test, we
dropped possibly endogenous controls such as hospital bed size, teaching
status, and physicians per capita. In another, we added a control for annual
Medicare managed care penetration in the county; this reduces the sample
size as this measure is not available for 2006 and 2007. Finally, we estimated
the models using a sample that includes the period when OPPSwas phased-in
(2001–2004). We continue to see that Medicare payment cuts are associated
with decreased provision of care to the uninsured by nonprofit hospitals, even
though the Medicare payment coefficients are somewhat smaller and less
precisely estimated in a few cases.
DISCUSSION
Uninsured patients treated at Florida hospitals between 1997 and 2008 com-
prise 5 percent of outpatient discharges and charges per hospital, per year. We
find that reductions in Medicare hospital outpatient payments reduce outpa-
tient care (measured in total charges) provided to the uninsured at nonprofit
hospitals. We do not observe a significant decrease in the number of uninsured
discharges, suggesting that hospitals reduce care on the intensive (but not
extensive) margin. At for-profit hospitals, Medicare payment decreases are
associated with a significant increase in the share of outpatient care provided
to the uninsured. Because the number of uninsured discharges does not also
increase, this is likely driven by declining numbers of Medicare patients.
A key advantage of our study is that we exploit an exogenous change in
Medicare outpatient payments using hospital- and year-specific payment data.
However, we note some limitations. First, our study examines hospitals in one
state. Florida’s large population and large number of hospitals may lessen
some concerns about generalizability; however, Florida has a relatively high
proportion of for-profit hospitals, so the profiles of the average nonprofit and
for-profit hospital in Florida may differ somewhat from the rest of the country.
This may affect how hospitals of different ownership types behave, especially
strategically. Thus, our results may not be representative of the entire United
States.
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Another limitation is that, as in similar studies, our measure of uninsured
discharges may include some self-pay patients who are well-off enough to pay
their bills. Their inclusion makes our dependent variable noisy. Furthermore,
suppose that for-profit hospitals respond to Medicare cuts by treating fewer
poor uninsured patients and simultaneously seeking high-income self-pay
patients; although the former contradicts the conceptual framework described
earlier, the two responses could offset one another so that overall, the total
number of uninsured patients at for-profit hospitals is unchanged. Thus, sepa-
rating paying uninsured patients may have implications for theory and policy.
Discharge records lack amounts paid by patients, so we cannot use that infor-
mation to identify paying patients. Instead, we use the best available proxy for
patient income to explore this further. Using self-pay discharges, we calculate
average median income in the patient’s county of residence separately for hos-
pitals in each ownership category. The average median income is very similar
at for-profit and nonprofit hospitals ($45,213 and $45,269, respectively, over
the sample period) and the difference is statistically insignificant (p = .9). This
is true for each individual year in our sample, too (p-values range from .4 to
.8). Thus, the evidence is not consistent with for-profits treating self-pay
patients who are wealthier than those treated at nonprofits. Future research
that distinguishes wealthy self-pay patients from the rest of the uninsured
would be valuable.
Our results have important policy implications. With the full imple-
mentation of the ACA, hospitals nationwide can expect to experience cuts
in Medicare payment rates and Medicare and Medicaid DSH payments.
In 19 states, including Florida, these cuts will likely take place without an
expansion of the Medicaid program, leaving millions uninsured. Given
our finding that nonprofit hospitals decreased outpatient care of the unin-
sured in response to Medicare rate cuts, communities dominated by non-
profit hospitals may experience reductions in the supply of outpatient care
to the uninsured. The potential reduction raises a number of questions
beyond the scope of this study, such as whether uninsured patients will
seek care from other types of providers and if providers will respond with
reductions in care quality, in addition to quantity. It is also important to
examine the potential long-term consequences on health and health care
costs, as outpatient care to the uninsured includes various preventive and
diagnostic care procedures. Future research should more carefully explore
these issues in the wake of the ACA.
Finally, it is worth noting that the predicted number of uninsured is
strongly associated with hospital provision of outpatient care for the unin-
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sured, especially among nonprofits. This may imply that policies to
reduce the number of uninsured could bring meaningful reductions in
nonprofit hospitals’ provision of outpatient care to the uninsured. As
many ACA provisions reduce the number of uninsured, a fuller examina-
tion of the law’s provisions regarding Medicare payments to hospitals
should consider the effects of declining numbers of uninsured persons.
Doing so would help determine whether the full set of policy changes
lessens the need for hospital care to the uninsured, and not just the incen-
tives for certain hospitals to provide such care.
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this
article:
Appendix SA1: AuthorMatrix.
Table A1. 25 Most Common Procedures on Uninsured Patients’ Hospi-
tal Outpatient Discharge Records, 2008.
Table A2. Full Regression Results from Models of Outpatient Care to
Uninsured Patients withMedicare Payment Rate, All Private Hospitals.
Table A3. Full Regression Results from Models of Outpatient Care to
Uninsured Patients withMedicare Payment Rate, Nonprofit Hospitals.
Table A4. Full Regression Results from Models of Outpatient Care to
Uninsured Patients withMedicare Payment Rate, For-Profit Hospitals.
Table A5. Robustness Checks of Medicare Payment Coefficients in
Models of Outpatient Care to Uninsured Patients.
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